3d03729fa1
* add cargo-deny exception for duplicate versions of windows-sys * cargo vetting for all new deps introduced by https://github.com/bytecodealliance/wasmtime/pull/5929 The audits are straightforward. The exemptions, as always, need to be justified: * core-foundation, core-foundation-sys, security-framework, security-framework-sys: these are large crates which are FFI bindings to Mac OS frameworks. As such they contain tons of unsafe code to make these FFI calls and manage memory. These crates are too big to audit. * schannel: same as the above, except this is a windows component, which I'm also unfamiliar with. * openssl, openssl-sys: also large FFI bindings which are impractical to audit. * futures-macro, futures-task: while not as complex as futures-util, these are beyond my personal understanding of futures to vet practically. I've asked Alex to look at auditing these, and he will after he returns from vacation next week. * futures-util: 25kloc of code, over 149 instances of the substring "unsafe" (case insensitive), this is impractical to audit in the extreme. * h2, http, httparse, hyper, mio, tokio: this so-called tokio/hyper family are very large and challenging to audit. Bobby Holley has indicated that he is working to get the AWS engineers who maintain these crates to publish their own audits, which we can then import. We expect to exempt these until those imports are available.
This directory contains the state for cargo-vet, a tool to help projects ensure that third-party Rust dependencies have been audited by a trusted entity. More about the tool can be found here: https://mozilla.github.io/cargo-vet/ The audits.toml file may be imported by other projects, and therefore should be handled with care. Ask for help if you're not sure.